Regulatory Burden

March 30th, 2014 by Potato

In the comments to the first post on regulating financial advisors someone brought up the issue of regulatory burden: the extra paperwork and delays imposed on businesses. Nicole went so far as to call it “onerous” and “strangling” — and that’s just for the regulation already in place, which we’ve criticized as not providing enough protection.

There are lots of examples of regulatory burden out there, for many stakeholders. I regularly suggest that people go with TD Waterhouse to be able to invest in e-series funds over TD Mutual Funds because of the extra steps and forms needed to fill out and mail in to convert an account and the possible limitations of the KYC forms. I never got my CFP/CSC because it’s just not worth my time to take the courses and exam for what the designations would bring me; if something like that were to be a mandatory requirement to talk to clients about investing and their financial plans that would keep me and several other part-time educators/planners/coaches/DIY-support people out of business.

But a certain amount of form-filling, records-keeping, and education overhead should be expected in any business. The correct amount of regulatory burden is highly unlikely to be zero, and if it brings important consumer protections then that’s a good thing.

However, the way regulations and reporting are structured can have huge impacts on the eventual regulatory burden. Consider for example something I have some experience with: applying for a grant to do some medical research. You could apply to the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) and or to the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR). In both cases the basic document outlining the experiment you’re looking to fund would be say 13 pages. On top of that you’d have a detailed 5-year budget and a justification for the funds you were seeking, a half-page lay summary for the funding agencies to release to the press or the elected government representatives, and some kind of CV to demonstrate that you had the experience and ability to carry out the research you proposed.

Now both funding agencies take very seriously the protection of research participants and have fairly similar rules and regulations in place for that protection, but the implementation and regulatory burden is night and day in my mind. In Canada, your grant would now basically be complete: CIHR’s protection of research subjects rules are separate from the grant process, and all institutions sign on to it before they can enter a competition. They know that any research is going to be reviewed by a research ethics board that meets their standards, and will get a copy of the approval before releasing funds (if you’re successful in the first place). If the experiment calls for anything terribly out of the ordinary, then it’ll have to be explained in the proposal anyway. Compare this to the US, where the proposal part of the grant submission is almost like an afterthought to the stacks of appendices and tables that have to be filled out — including some that no one really seems to understand (including the NIH help staff I’ve spoken to), where you have to predict the racial breakdown for any proposed study (how many whites, blacks, asians, etc. will you recruit), but then also the “latino/non-latino ethnic breakdown” (how many latino asians vs non-latino asians will you include in your study??). It’s stressful and confusing (Spain and Portugal aren’t included in the countries of origin for people considered hispanic?) and totally bizarre (why do they care about this stuff? Will they really reject my grant over this?). For basically the same mandate and ultimate protection of research subjects, the regulatory burden is quite different between the agencies because of how they approach the problem and where they place the reporting requirements. By having so much paperwork up at the application stage it creates a lot of work for the ~80% of NIH applicants who will not get their grants funded because the scientific component wasn’t competitive enough for the severely limited funds.

Also, some protection comes with virtually no on-going regulatory burden. The Residential Tenancies Act sets out many protections for tenants, but aside from modifying what you can put into a lease there is no paperwork for landlords or tenants to fill out in the regular course of business beyond what you’d need anyway. Indeed, you get some of that for better than free: by standardizing certain terms, responsibilities, and practices they don’t have to be separately negotiated and drawn up in a lease. Everything is handled on an enforcement basis: only after a problem arises does someone end up having paperwork to fill out. Now at that point it can be very onerous (dealing with the LTB is no picnic, especially for landlords), mostly due to the delays involved. But for most people most of the time, it’s reasonably strong regulation with little overhead cost.

So I think that implementing a better model for financial advice and regulation thereof can be done in a way that minimizes the regulatory burden. It’s something that can and should be kept in mind as a new regulatory framework is thought out (especially the implementation aspect), and kept in balance with the benefits.

Regulation Examples

March 24th, 2014 by Potato

In the last post we talked about the importance of regulation: to create an environment where a non-expert, without the ability to independently evaluate an expert, can come to trust a complete stranger because of the regulations and mechanisms in place to create and maintain quality and ethics. There are lots of examples of industries and professions with varying degrees of regulation that we can learn from.

Car salesmen are regulated (OMVIC in Ontario). The regulations set some minimum standards for disclosure and how prices can be advertised: it’s not especially strong legislation (for instance, the dealer does not have an obligation to work in the best interest of the customer), but then the general public understands explicitly that the car salesperson sitting across the desk from them is in a sales role. They don’t couch themselves as “transportation advisors”, and if you went to one you would know that they would try to sell you a car (and you would not walk away with a recommendation for a bicycle and transit pass even if those might suit your situation better). They might be able to help you pick a particular car that’s suitable: compact over a truck, but even then you know that if you walk into a Chrysler dealership with a need for something fuel efficient you won’t be driving out in a Prius or Leaf: the best they could do is a 4-cylinder gasser that their dealership sells. To my mind, this is most analogous to the current MFDA designation in the financial sphere, but without the universal, mutual understanding of the sales and commission-driven nature of the role.

Some trade organizations exist more to protect their members and a monopoly than to protect consumers and build trust with the public. Since it’s been a while since I’ve done so, let’s pick on realtors: there are minimal barriers to entry, and no formalized processes to manage conflicts-of-interest (except for those set up at individual brokerage offices). There is a dispute mechanism, but from casually looking at cases and allegations, they seem to take realtor-on-realtor aggro way more seriously than allegations of misleading or mistreating the lay public. In other words, CREA/TREB is not a model I would want to copy: the initial quality standard is not rigourous, there’s no continuous improvement, there’s next to no policing or efforts to maintain the public trust: it appears to be a trade organization out to serve its own interests.

In cases where the decisions are literally life-or-death the regulatory body tends to take a more active role. Medical physicists for instance are responsible for calculating radiation doses in cancer therapy and ensuring that the machines are accurately delivering the doses prescribed. Over-dosing can kill through radiation effects, underdosing can allow cancer to proliferate. The Canadian College of Physicists in Medicine requires a graduate degree in one of several related fields, a fellowship program (education), examination, continuing education, periodic re-certification, and practice reviews.

Banking, at least the deposit-taking part, is a highly regulated industry. Not just anyone can rent out a space with marble pillars and a vault and call themselves a bank. Because trust is essential to preventing a run on the banks, a government-backed insurance scheme (CDIC) is in place to guarantee that if all of the regulations and oversight somehow still manages to fail, depositors will get their money back (up to a limit of $100,000 per account). Now, that’s not to say that a bank won’t ding you with service charges or sell you services you don’t need — they walk a fine but well-defined line of trust and conflicting interests for sales.

Franchises are not something handed down by the government or enshrined in law, yet by building strong brands people know that stopping at McDonald’s or Subway for a meal will provide a fairly uniform meal experience — they can trust that even in a strange city far from home that they’re going to get what they expect. It’s a way of accomplishing the end goal of letting someone with no easy way of independently evaluating quality to walk in off the street and know that they’ll be in good hands.

So what would I like to see? I think good regulation will be stronger and faster* than building up a brand/franchise, though the end result might be better that way as an organization shooting for excellence doesn’t have to play to the lowest common denominator. Either way, I think getting rid of embedded commissions and their inherent conflicts-of-interest and obfuscation is the first step: it’s an uphill battle for education and standards if that basic component of the business model isn’t fixed first. We could follow the UK and Australia in that direction, and it will be interesting to see how their experience plays out over the next few years.

Either way, training and examination requirements at the start, including an ability to explain how fees work, the impact of fees, cash flow planning, and managing behavioural issues. Explaining risk at some level is necessary but is tough because even experts have trouble defining it precisely — perhaps just understanding that there are aspects of risk. Levels or specializations of certification, and an understanding that some situations should be kicked up the chain. Re-examination, auditing of practices, and other systems to keep quality high. And a correction mechanism: some way to feed back new or unresolved problems back through continuing education, to arbitrate disputes, and compensate customers who were wronged.

The regulatory body should ideally be separated from the body that looks to maintain a monopoly or promote the profession so that it can be client-serving and not self-serving. Because it can be confusing as to what the responsibilities of the advisor are (especially if a term like “advisor” is used), someone (who?) should make it clear to the public what the relationship is, possibly disclosed up front (“Hi, I’m a salesperson and I do not have a responsibility to do what’s best for you, just to make my commission and not recommend something egregiously bad. Let’s look at a 7-seater, shall we?”).

Unfortunately I still haven’t had a chance to read the private member’s bill in Ontario so this might all be covered already.

* – from implementation to helping people. It will likely be slower to be crafted and passed in the first place.

Regulation of Financial Advisors

March 20th, 2014 by Potato

CBC Marketplace recently ran an episode looking at financial “advisors”, sending a woman in to several with money to invest and a hidden camera that has made some waves. Some advisors were ok (which of course didn’t air), but there were some that were just atrocious. They provided shockingly bad advice, or couldn’t answer simple questions about how much they were paid and what fees would be.

I don’t know how the advisors were selected: the show gave the appearance of picking randomly from large firms, but they may have been tipped off about bad ones in advance. The industry has tried to couch this as just a case of running into a few bad apples, but as Sandi says, that’s a load of bull and lets them continue to get away with a broken model for the industry. Some of them were so bad that a bad apple metaphor doesn’t cut it, but rather one with a grenade in it. That should never have happened.

Yet such incredibly bad advice is not so unusual — the system and the major firms do not set a high bar for financial advice.

This is a major issue. Financial advice/planning has a large impact on people’s lives, yet conflicts of interest abound and problems take years to show up. Moreover, people who need advice largely do not have the ability to evaluate the quality of their advisors (even with the benefit of hindsight), so recommendations from friends are basically useless. Combine all that with hidden and confusing fees, and this is an industry that cries out for regulation. A we-can-do-better retreat and voluntary code of conduct is not going to cut it.

Regulation can come in many forms: the government can step in to regulate from the top down, or industry groups can self-regulate. Often a hybrid emerges, where the government will help legally protect a professional title, and members of that organization will self-regulate.

Right now, the conflicts of interest inherent to the existing salescritter-cum-advisor model are making it to the public consciousness. That erodes trust in the whole system, yet there’s very little in place to replace it.

Here is the central issue as I see it: the system needs to be reformed so that someone with no knowledge and no way to evaluate quality in advance can go to get advice from someone and trust in that advice (and get reasonable value for the fees that they pay while they’re at it). And really the best way to build trust for the lay public is to have a trustworthy expert give the thumbs-up — that is, regulation.

What does good regulation look like? There’s some kind1 of quality standard set, with a mechanism to get it there in the first place (training, examinations). There’s a mechanism to maintain quality, through reducing conflicts-of-interest; ongoing training and continuing education; ongoing oversight, evaluation, and auditing; and even formalized specializations. And a way to make things right when the few bad apples inevitably get in: dispute resolution mechanisms, compensation funds. In return, a profession gets formalized and protected credentials and naming rights. Culture is important: a focus on ethics and client needs, on openness and honesty.

Not every element is required there. And government isn’t necessarily required: creating a brand that people can trust can also work. That can be a faster approach to get started, but doesn’t carry as much weight without the government behind it. In the next post I’ll look at some examples of professions that are out there now and how they are regulated. In the meantime, check out this week’s BecauseMoney podcast where I discussed this issue with hosts Sandi Martin, Jackson Middleton, and special guest Noel D’Souza.

1- actually the quality standard itself is important too — it should serve the right people (i.e. the public rather than the banks), have associated metrics, be achievable, consider structural issues and conflicts-of-interest, etc.

The Absurdity of Index Investing

March 13th, 2014 by Potato

Many people don’t believe in index investing, looking instead for ways to beat the market and eke out those last few percentage points of return.

I get it: index investing is an absurd concept. Most popular indexes were never intended to be investment products: they were simply a way to try to get an average figure for the stock market so journalists could succinctly report what was happening on Wall/Bay St. when filling the paper and TV screens with non-actionable noise (…I mean news). That such an arbitrary collection of companies should end up being the most highly recommended way to invest seems to stretch credibility.

“Surely,” the argument goes, “out of 500-some companies I can find 10 that are obviously going to do worse than the average and exclude them, and find 10 that are obviously going to out-perform and over-weight those, and then I’ll out-perform indexing.” And I don’t know — maybe you can. But likely not, at least not without so much work (or paying someone else to put in the work) that the costs undermine the gains. And if you can maybe get the extreme outliers, the temptation is to keep going with the tweaking until long past the point where any move you make is more likely to be wrong than right. It’s a losers’ game.

Still, the mind rebels against the concept.It can’t be that indexing works, after all, there’s a whole profession created around the idea of investing through active management. If the argument that the active investors are the market — so the average active investor gets the average market return less fees — were true then a whole industry by rights should not exist. But it does, therefore there must be something better than active investing, QED. The studies exist though: the best data is on mutual funds, which by a very large margin do not beat their indexes net of fees.



Of course, we live in a crazy, irrational world. The lure of the possibility of doing better (and rubbing your peers’ noses in it), of finding that fund manager who’s secretly the next Buffett, Lynch, or Soros is irresistible to many. We’ve all heard of those guys who made it big by just having the right idea at the right time — whether it was a tech company, a mining stock, or shorting the housing market — and we’ve all got ideas of our own. We’re greedy, and there’s a driving need to be better, even if it means taking risks to get there. Setting out to be average is a tough nut to swallow, even if doing so actually makes you an above-average investor who can more easily avoid the emotional foibles of the masses.

Or maybe your salescritter moves the goalposts and instead of promising better returns instead breaks out language regarding absolute returns or lower volatility. That can be shockingly persuasive: even though human drivers can make all kinds of deadly errors, nobody wants a robot car on the road. The thought that some human agency is driving your portfolio — even if they’re driving it into the ground — can seem more reassuring than the thought that you have turned everything over to a passive sampling of global capitalism.

And even when you’ve heard about how “fees matter”, the fees sound so very small — single-digit percentages or even “basis points” — that it’s hard to believe the effect is so profound. Surely paying 1% to this really smart-sounding guy will be worth it when he out-performs, right? It was to the people who invested five years ago…

Yes, past performance is no guarantee of future results, but — aha! — doesn’t that also apply to index investing being the way to go? And looking at past results is so important as it’s one of the few pieces of data accessible, and we have to look at something — investing should be work. That’s a law of nature or something, right? No: it’s hard to accept, but making things easy and uncomplicated is a virtue. If it makes it easier to stick to your plan and not panic or screw things up through human error, then that’s a further way that indexing is a good approach to take (and to recommend). Rather than procrastinating on a hard method that’s likely going to underperform, it’s really easy — and satisfying — to push someone just getting started towards indexing.

Then, after all the absurdities and cognitive biases have been stripped away, you see that indexing isn’t quite so absurd after all. A cap-weighted index minimizes the amount of rebalancing that has to happen on an ongoing basis as valuations fluctuate. Big indexes are well-diversified, and even if they were meant for reporting more than buying, they work quite well if there’s some scale involved (which Vanguard, Horizon, BMO, TD, Tangerine, or iShares can easily provide). Because there’s nothing else to compete on (the vendors want to track the same thing as closely as possible) the fees get cut as close to zero as possible.

Even after accepting that indexing is the way to go, that urge to outperform and make it into work can remain. We all know someone who uses ETFs to invest, but is not in any sense a passive index investor. They may try to time the market, or just over-fit their asset allocation model, digging up ever more specific sector and individual country funds to own, with their portfolio allocated down to fractions of a percent. There are some who acknowledge the happenstance origins of indexing, and who try to create better indexes (fundamental, value-tilted, etc.) that still embrace the core principles of broad diversification and fee minimization.

Though no matter what path led to the indexes we have, in the end it’s the best strategy available for the vast majority of people investing for the long run.

Updated Rent-vs-Buy Calculator

March 8th, 2014 by Potato

Thanks to some discussions with people (and Redditors) I have updated the rent-vs-buy investment method calculator (aka the ultimate rent-vs-buy comparison tool for Canadians). You can see the spreadsheet in Google Drive here (and save a copy to your own Google Drive or download in various spreadsheet formats) or click here to download it in Excel format.

Please see the original page for instructions, and the follow-up discussions: part 1 on things to consider and discussion questions, and part 2 on the sensitivity to various inputs changing.

If you haven’t seen this before, it’s a very detailed and customizable rent-vs-buy calculator. It assumes that all else being equal, you can compare apples-to-apples options for your shelter. If buying costs more, the renter will save the difference in monthly cash flow and invest it. It allows you to model a change in interest rates over time (specifying a rate for years 1-5, 5-10, and 10+), includes the effect of transaction fees, house price appreciation, taxes on the renter’s investments, and most importantly: investment returns that compound over time.

What’s new:

  • The default mortgage rate is now 3.49%, the lowest big-bank 5-year fixed rate my rate-comparing friends at ratesupermarket.ca were able to find. With the move to a 5-year fixed (the most common option chosen) I’ve updated the back-end mortgage calculations to account for the bizarre 6-month compounding of fixed mortgages in Canada.
  • The CMHC charges have been updated for the recently announced changes (though those won’t take effect for another month).
  • The summary box (scroll over to the right) now also says how much the buying case wins by (in the event that it does) so you don’t have to look down at the full results table.
  • The default comparison has been updated. I’ve just spent a quick half hour searching for comparable listings and found many exact — same unit — apples-to-apples comparisons, and Toronto’s price-to-rent is easily over 240X right now1.




I have been asked about creating a space for fudge factors (in particular, to model the case where the owner gets a roommate or rents out a basement/secondary suite2) and I have not included that and do not feel persuaded to. Having such a field would just invite non-comparable comparisons (like comparing renting a full house to owning half of one with a call option on the rest). It’s a spreadsheet, so it’s not hard to account for such cash flows (for instance, just over-write the maintenance fee column with a combination of increased maintenance fees from being a landlord and a negative cash cost item for the rent income), and I would much prefer you think deeply about it by doing it manually than just jumping ahead to the fudge cell to justify buying.

1. I was overly fair to the buying case before and renting was still better — a point that was lost on many. The comparison now starts with one such matched pair (in North York). Renting now totally blows buying out of the water. I don’t want to belabour the Toronto housing bubble issue too much (I’d rather people focus on the usefulness of the tool and try it out for their own purposes without getting distracted by my situation), but it’s not even close guys. And I’m still being too fair by being at the bottom of the range — many of the condos that were “only” 240X had maintenance fees of ~1.4-1.5%, vs the sheet’s default of 1.1%, and those condo fees don’t even cover all maintenance/upkeep needs.
2. I already had a short post on this topic, but in brief: if it doesn’t make sense to rent out a whole house, how does renting out half of one suddenly become financial genius?

Update: Etienne (who was featured by Garth Turner recently) emailed me with the fix for a minor bug: the CMHC premium was being applied to the whole house value rather than just the loan value. Fixed as of March 15, 2014. The magnitude of the error depends on the downpayment; for example with 5% down it made the mortgage 0.15% too large, for 10% down it was 0.24% too large.