Investing Book Second Edition

September 11th, 2013 by Potato

A reader recently emailed me saying that he liked my investing book so much he was going to read it again after letting everything percolate for a few months. He wanted to know if I had a second edition coming out soon. It has been two years now since I wrote the book, so perhaps a revision is due.

I’ve given very nearly zero thought to a second edition: I have an errata page to catch the very few corrections and changes that cropped up, and other than updating the historical results for the past two years there really isn’t anything fundamental to change. That’s the beauty of a simple, passive approach. I might give it another round or two of editing/polish, and maybe add a graph or two, but nothing so major that I would go to the trouble of doing a new edition — it was intended to be timeless (also: sales have dropped to zero, removing motivation).

Reader feedback has been universally positive — it’s actually freaking me out. Most people (as expected) don’t write a review or pester the author, but a few have written back with brief notes of thanks or praise. No one has suggested changes, said that a part confused them, or that something obvious was missing. It makes me wonder if Wayfare wakes up early every morning to clear the inevitable negative ones out of my email and comment queue to spare my ego, as there’s no way nobody has wanted to complain that it was a waste of their $5, the world just doesn’t work that way. It may be due to the small sample size: even after two years I’ve still only sold a few dozen copies.

So an open question: what would you like to see in a second edition?

I cut a few chapters from the initial outline: I wanted to finish before my PhD thesis defense prep picked up again, and more importantly, thought it was vital that the book be short and approachable (unlike my blog). I figured there were numerous sources on the whys of investing and the indexing choice, and on budgeting, so I could focus on the missing component of the hows. One I’ve been thinking about has been expanding the single page on planning, in large part because I’ve had a few decent blog posts on the matter for material (including a rather important spreadsheet) that came out after the book was published. However, there are whole books on planning — whole careers on it — and it could rapidly grow on me to become a book in its own right, not to mention that it’s not really my specialty (maybe I can convince Sandi to co-author it and do most of the work?).

But maybe you think less is more: is there something that should be cut? Have other, newer books on the market supplanted the need for my book entirely?

Let me know what you think, what you want, what you never knew you needed until this one perfect moment of comment section inspiration seized you.

As an aside, PSGtDIYI (wow that’s an ugly acronym, no wonder I just call it the book) is self-published in electronic-only formats (though with a letter-sized PDF version for easy printing at home). That was in part to test the market before committing the time and resources to finding a publisher or making print versions — and the response was not strong enough for me to look into that further. But my dad at least thinks that this material would be better-suited to a print version, and suggested I do a small print run for it. Though I doubt a serious publisher would be interested in it (the format is too weird), that route might lend it some additional credibility. If nothing else, a print version is something I can give away to people who need it and they might actually read it. Very roughly speaking, I would likely need to charge closer to $10 for a print edition, even for a quick copy shop spiral-bound deal (and bear in mind it is a very thin book printed out, and many people value their books by weight). Thoughts on that?

A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to My Point

September 11th, 2013 by Potato

Not so long ago, I read an article refuting efficient market theory, using the example of Tanzanian Royalty Exploration as a case of an obvious inefficiency. It’s a strange example to pick, because it doesn’t actually support the thesis.

A quick refresher: just over two years ago Sino-Forest was exposed as a fraud (at the time, alleged to be fraudulent). It plunged in price, losing some 75% in the first few days. Sino-Forest traded on the TSX under the symbol TRE. At the same time, a company called Tanzanian Royalty Exploration fell about 8% in a few days. It happened to have the same ticker symbol — TRE — but on a different stock exchange. The story was that in the panic to dump Sino-Forest, some people were entering the wrong exchange for the TRE symbol and accidentally selling off Tanzanian. Ha ha, crazy market, what a clear inefficiency! Tanzanian even went out of their way to change ticker symbols to avoid the confusion/stigma.

As cute as that narrative is, it hasn’t panned out: here we are almost two years later and Tanzanian has not come anywhere close to its May 2011 high. The drop co-incident with the Muddy Waters report on Sino-Forest could perhaps have been an inefficiency, but given the continued slide (now down 55% in two years) it appears as though it might have been a true, “efficient” decline after all. Perhaps the close timing and similar tickers are merely one of life’s funny coincidences. Nobody who identified the coincident ticker symbols and price drops at the time and assumed it was a market inefficiency made any money trying to play it. And I don’t think anyone using the example a year or more later is making a very strong case for active investing.

Macro Investing

August 21st, 2013 by Potato

Netbug asked how to invest in lab-grown meat (as well as a number of other emerging trends). I think that top-down investing is very difficult to do. You can be right overall, but so many factors can prevent you from making money on the call:

1. The profit source isn’t where you think it is. Maybe only private companies are in the area so you can’t invest, or maybe it’s not the guys with the mines that make money in a gold rush, but the guys selling pickaxes and lanterns (or not the guys selling 3D printers, but the stodgy old chemical supply companies with the polymer supplies).

2. The sector moves ahead while companies stumble and fall behind. The airline sector is an interesting one: you could have foreseen an age where people fly all across the globe, hundreds of flights into every major city every day of the week. And if you tried to invest in the airlines as they were founded you likely lost money on that vision. They have gone bankrupt with notorious regularity. People still fly, new airlines emerge (and old ones reorganized and brought out of bankruptcy), but that knowledge hasn’t been very profitable.

Similarly with cell phones: the omniconnected world comes closer every day. Everyone has a cell phone. People are disconnecting landlines in favour of cell phones, something that might have been unfathomable 20 years ago with the spotty service, high cost, poor voice quality, and miserable battery life of early cell phones. Yet even though the vision of a technological future you had may be coming true exactly as you pictured it (right down to that prophetic dream you had about touchscreens), it’s unclear how you should have invested in that trend. Motorola had it’s rise and fall, as did Nokia and then RIM. Apple could well be next. The carriers have done fabulously well in Canada and the US, but some European ones have barely paced their indexes. Cisco was meh while Nortel blew itself up. Maybe you would have been lucky enough to spot Qualcomm in the early nineties (though if you didn’t think about it until the late 90’s you were too late).

3. The market prices in expectations, so not only do you have to be right in your vision, but you have to be one of the few to see it (or at least one of the first). Converting a portion of our vehicle fleet to run on natural gas makes sense for emissions and because of the huge differential the past few years (and projected to remain so) between the price of NG and oil. However, everyone already knows this, so the price of Westport Innovations is through the roof. For many years pharmaceutical stocks had outrageous multiples as everyone counted down the years until the baby boomers’ health started failing.

Enough people have asked me how to invest in certain trends and I’ve banged my head against enough walls trying to figure it out that I have to throw my hands in the air and say I can’t do it. I’m just wired up to be a bottom-up investor (and at least partially as an indexer). But I also think it’s just an inherently harder problem, with more moving parts to spot.

The best macro idea I’ve had has been the Canadian housing bubble. The evidence is there, and it’s contrarian enough that it’s not priced in to a large degree. The problem is I can’t think of what to go long on for that bet, and there aren’t any good hugely asymmetric payoffs like subprime CDOs. The best I’ve got really is to short a few stocks, and the timing is just too hard to call for a straight short or expensive, illiquid put.

The Impossible Home Capital Group

July 26th, 2013 by Potato

Home Capital Group (TSE:HCG) is an interesting company that draws very polarized views. On the one hand, there are a great many people out there who love it without digging any further into it than “it pays a growing dividend.” One of my favourite bits of astounding logic from a HCG bull when researching it was “there is no housing bubble because house prices didn’t go down last year.” On the other hand, many bears seem to stop their analysis at “there is a housing bubble, and they’re an alt lender, therefore short.” I wanted to dig into it a bit more to see if it might be worth shorting.

My main questions were: How vulnerable is it to a housing correction? What does the mortgage mix look like, what’s the credit profile and payment history of their borrowers? How are they funded, are there any debt covenants, and what capital reserves do they have? I’m not terribly comfortable with the idea of shorting something, so if I’m going to start to get really bearish on housing, I want to make sure that this is going to blow up good and proper before betting against it. Basically, reduced earnings and growth won’t be good enough: they’ll have to be forced to eliminate the dividend at the very least under a modest correction scenario for me to be comfortable shorting it — as only after they kill the dividend will the pool of surface-analysis dividend growth investors move to sell it.

What I found in a preliminary investigation is a company that is growing like stink. “Ah-ha,” I thought, “they must be spending crazy amounts of cash to advertise and give the brokers enough kick-backs to send all the business their way.” No — they have a ~30% efficiency ratio, which they claim is industry-leading (spot check: half that of BMO’s — lower is better).

Hmm, well, if they’re drumming up business and not spending money to do it, then I thought “they must have poor credit quality as they’ll just take everyone who shows up at the door. So their default rates must be awful, especially if they’re not paying any appraisers.” Wrong again: their default rate is quite low (on par with the banks right now), and even in 2009 barely breached 1% (good for an alt lender, about 3X worse than the national average at the time).

Only one option left I can think of: they’re attracting the best alt credit risks to them by discounting their rates, and people are seeking them out on a price basis. No again: they have a higher return on equity and net interest margin than BMO, despite holding more capital in reserve. A spot check on mortgage comparison sites puts them at about 3.5% for a 5-year rate vs BMO at 3.6% and the lowest-price entry at 3.4%; they’re amongst the most expensive on variable rates.

Well, it’s an enigma. I know they’re small (~5-10% of a big bank) which leaves more runway for growth, but this is unbelievable: they grow fast, without seeming to pay for it in any way (profitability, portfolio risk/defaults, leverage). Any insights into the secret of taking market share from the big 6 banks without spending money to do so? Part of the really low efficiency ratio is that they just do mortgages: branch staff to sell mutual funds and take deposits cost a lot for not much revenue; on the flip side, they don’t have the economies of scale for advertising (but that first factor will dominate). Maybe their business plan is too inherently wonderful, their management team is full of wizards, and I am a fool to even consider shorting such a beautiful business, housing bubble or no.

Or maybe there’s something I just don’t understand. I’m leaning towards ignorant skepticism at this point, and welcome corrections and explanations.

Spring Personal Finance and HST Instructions

July 20th, 2013 by Potato

Sandi Martin of Spring (the blog) has stormed onto the PF blogosphere. I’ve added her to the blogroll on the side there, but wanted to point you to a few posts in particular.

In my book I recommended TD Waterhouse as the go-to place for new index investors, largely because of their low-cost, easy e-series index funds and because then you’d have a decent brokerage account you were comfortable with when it came time to “graduate” to ETFs. Not long after the book was e-published, a number of other brokerages (e.g., Scotia) came out with free-to-trade ETFs, presenting a competitive alternative to TD Waterhouse. People wrote to me asking if my recommendation had changed, and while I couldn’t be as singular about it, I would still recommend TDW. It was a bit of waffling about simplicity (the list of free-to-trade ETFs is fairly daunting, and misses the usual recommendations), a bit about customer service (which even if you only need it once is still important if you’re a new investor trying to get something going and you don’t even know what it is you’re trying to ask for), and a bit about e-series allowing you to optimize/maximize your investing with monthly savings plans thanks to a low minimum and the ability to invest in arbitrary increments. Sandi managed to articulate this very well in a recent post:

“…you’ll find a lot of reviews that talk about “$9.95 trades” and “great research tools”. Those features just don’t matter […] Your wish list is heavily slanted towards the cost to invest in, hold, and rebalance a portfolio of index funds, and the minimum purchase requirements for regular investment plans. “Ease of use” doesn’t even make the list, and neither does “research and education” or “personal rate of return tracking”…”

Now of course she recommended my book in this post on mutual funds, so that is going to get a link. It’s also a nice, succinct piece on why people should look to boring index investing.

She’s got a series on avoiding “the useless retirement plan” (start here), building off her experiences working at a bank.

And she mentions the deceptive “may” in the HST instructions in this post on the matter. Well we got caught in that same confusing wording, and seeing that others are also having problems with it means its time to write someone to get it fixed. So I wrote an email to my MP and a letter to the CRA (Taxpayer Services Directorate; Canada Revenue Agency; 395 Terminal Avenue; Ottawa, ON K1A 0L5), copied below:

Dear [My MP];

I’m writing you today in regards to some confusing instructions at the Canada Revenue Agency. For small businesses that collect HST, after reaching $3,000 in tax for a fiscal year the Canada Revenue Agency requires quarterly tax installments, rather than annual payments. However, the instructions say:

“If you are an annual filer and your net tax for a fiscal year is $3,000 or more, you may have to make quarterly installment payments throughout the following fiscal year” [emphasis mine] http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/gp/rc4022/rc4022-e.html

That “may” has caused some confusion for business owners and freelancers within my own family, as well as other cases I have recently heard of in the community. The CRA requires quarterly payments once the $3,000 threshold is reached, and does not send notice, instructions, reminders, or a payment schedule. If quarterly installments are not made, they levy interest. Yet the instructions do not make it clear that it is up to the small business to remit quarterly without further instructions — indeed, the “may” suggests that they would not have to remit quarterly unless directed otherwise.

This confusion is exacerbated by the contrast with income taxes, where the CRA does explicitly direct the taxpayer when and how to remit quarterly when they are so required.

I am not asking for the tax law to be changed, but rather for the procedures and instructions to be clarified to prevent this common error from occurring. Two potential solutions that come to mind are:

  1. Change the procedure to include a notice period, and have the CRA lay out a schedule for quarterly HST installment payments (as with the income tax).
  2. Change the instructions to make it clear that small businesses must remit quarterly, and should not expect advanced direction from the CRA.

Thank you for any help you can offer in fixing this for other small business owners. I want to mention that my own situation has long since been cleared up, so I do not need any personal help with HST. I have sent a similar letter to the Taxpayer Services Directorate of the Canada Revenue Agency.

Sincerely;
[Me]

Please feel free to take from this, put it into your own words, and help make a small change that can save administration work at the CRA and penalty interest and headaches at numerous small businesses.

As an aside, it makes me wonder how apropos it is that the address for suggestions is on terminal avenue…